Russian intelligence agent wanted to buy mini submarine “as a gift for a friend” – E24

PST says they have stopped several deals between “diplomats” and Norwegian companies. – Fears that the Russian defense will be the ultimate end user.

Russian military intelligence (GRU) has on several occasions in the last couple of years tried to buy advanced technical equipment, including underwater equipment, from Norwegian companies, says PST to E24.

Police Superintendent Dag Røhjell, who is an adviser at the Counter-Intelligence Section of the PST, says that in at least three cases, Russian intelligence has bought or tried to buy equipment that the PST believes could be on its way to the Russian defence.

The cases concern three people who PST believes have operated in Norway under diplomatic cover, but where in reality they have worked for the Russian military intelligence service GRU.

The PST will not go into why they believe these Russians are GRU officers, but says their behavior is not consistent with the behavior of an ordinary diplomat.

Røhjell will not comment on whether the GRU agents behind these attempts are among the 15 diplomats who were recently expelled from Norway, or whether they have been expelled before.

– Part of the activity that we have followed from Russian intelligence officers in Norway – in terms of acquisition attempts, attempts to buy technology and products – is part of the basis that we have worked with for the 15, without necessarily being linked to these individuals.

According to PST, these acquisition attempts have targeted more and more high-tech products along the way, but where the products they buy first are so-called off-the-shelf products without restrictions.

– Then we fear that the Russian defense will be the final end user, says Røhjell.

These are three cases where PST believes GRU officers have tried to buy products from Norwegian companies. The cases are not previously known to the Norwegian public:

Bought for brother:

Towards the end of 2021, a small Norwegian company was contacted and approached by a diplomat who belonged to Russian military intelligence (GRU), PST believes. The man did not say what he did or where he worked, but said he was Russian.

He seemed interested in buying equipment the company had or could obtain, and specifically various high-tech measuring instruments. The GRU officer, who had said he wanted to buy the equipment on behalf of his brother, wanted to pay a six-figure sum in cash. The company did not accept payment in cash, and the officer ended up paying electronically.

He first bought what PST describes as innocent products, which were also for sale in Moscow. At the same time, the Russian GRU officer wanted to establish closer ties with the leader of the enterprise by cultivating him, but the offer was rejected.

Gradually, the goods he wanted to order became more advanced and moved towards a gray area, products that could conceivably have a military application. PST feared that the Russian defense was the ultimate end user.

The company finally asked the Russian to come up with one end user declaration end user declarationa guarantee about who will ultimately use the material, which he said he would provide. But such a declaration was never delivered and the deal was terminated. In this case, PST became involved at an early stage.

Mini Submarines:

Towards the end of 2021, what PST believes to be a GRU officer contacted a Norwegian company that operates advanced mini-submarines (ROBBERY ROBBERYremote operated underwater vehicle, a remote-controlled underwater vehicle that is used instead of divers, especially at great depths).

The GRU officer, who, according to PST, was attached to the Russian embassy as a diplomat, said he wanted to buy two ROVs, explaining that they were to be a gift for a friend.

PST became involved along the way, in what Røhjell calls a double operation, and the deal did not go through.

Arrived in embassy car:

PST says that in 2019 a GRU officer drove the embassy car to a Norwegian business that sells underwater technology. He was interested in buying measuring equipment for use underwater, including thickness gauges and a varied range of equipment that can be used for diving with possible military application, which can therefore be classified as a strategic product.

After quite a long time, he tried to get hold of a product that was more sensitive, which the Norwegian company could supply to Norway. The Norwegian company was unable to obtain the product.

The Russian officer wanted to pay in cash, but the company was unable to accept the cash for the products purchased. The officer paid through proforma invoices.

The company only contacted PST after the war in Ukraine started on 24 February last year.

None of the Norwegian companies from these examples were prosecuted, states PST.

“Makes all activity related to Russia suspicious”

E24 has confronted the Russian embassy with the allegations from PST. The embassy does not go into the actual allegations, but refers to a statement given in connection with the cases to NRK, SVT, YLE and DR in the series “Skyggekrigerne”.

Here, spokesperson for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Maria Zakharova states, among other things:

– Due to a lack of convincing arguments, they (the media ed. note) suspect all activity connected to Russia and the work of Russian diplomats. A new wave of spy mania in the Nordic countries and their demonization of Russia is causing irreparable damage to relations with our country.

Starting with “off the shelf”

According to PST, there is a trend for intelligence agents to first buy typical “off the shelf” items from the company. There are products that are unproblematic and that PST is not concerned about. Before it develops into more advanced products.

PST calls this “escalating procurement activity”. Norwegian companies may think that this is the development of a normal customer relationship. It is also the target of Russian intelligence, the security service warns.

At the same time, it is often small and medium-sized businesses that are most exposed to this type of activity, but which are also dependent on the business they offer.

– And then it is about the awareness of Norwegian companies. If a Norwegian citizen comes and wants to buy a product, then it’s nothing crazy.

– But if Norwegian companies do not check who will have the product, if someone with a Russian name wants the product sent to Drammensveien 74, which is the Russian embassy. Perhaps the awareness has been a little lacking in some cases, says Dag Røhjell.

He goes on to say that this particularly applies to technological products that Russia needs now to an even greater extent than before, given the sanctions the country is subject to.

– Another important point is that this does not only include military or advanced civilian products, but also other forms of advanced technology where Norway is far ahead in terms of development, emphasizes Røhjell.

Without commenting on the number of procurement cases, PST states that the activity of those registered before February 2022 has decreased.

Highly prioritized

PST sees a trend in Russian attempts to acquire underwater technology, which began before 24 February last year, and that underwater technology is a high priority for the Russians.

According to the security service, this applies not only to any Russian intelligence officers who are in Norway or elsewhere in Europe, but also to Russian companies and actors in general who are trying to obtain underwater technology in particular.

PST says that there are many businesses in Norway that focus on sensitive technology. This does not only apply to military technology, but can be civil technology that can also have a military application which initially may not appear like this, where Norwegian businesses must assess this aspect.